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Abstract 
Cuing techniques which rely on the experimenter to select appropriate cues have 
been shown to increase recall but also increase errors in children's recall. To 
investigate the use of emotion as a cue to enhance young children's recall of a 
happy event, 56 5 and 6 year old children were read a story in their kindergarten 
classroom by a clown. It was predicted that emotion cues, which can be 
produced by the child and therefore reduce possible experimenter interaction, 
would not inflate errors, and would increase recall. Children were randomly 
assigned to one of three recall conditions: ( a) free recall, (b) constructing a 
facial expression consistent with the original emotional state prior to recall, and 
( c) engaging in emotional re-enactment of the original emotional state prior to 
recall. Compared to the free recall condition, emotional re-enactment was found 
to significantly increase the amount of accurate information recalled by children 
while facial expression had no effect on recall. Children made very few errors 
in all of the conditions. Emotional re-enactment was a useful strategy for cuing 
children's happy memories without inflating the number of errors in recall. The 
usefulness of this technique is discussed in terms of its application to clinical 
and investigative interviews with children. 
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Introduction 
Clinical interviews with young children rely on children's abilities to respond 
openly and accurately to adult questions. Under conditions of free recall young 
children typically recall limited information. When the interviewer introduces 
verbal cues and physical props to enhance memories, the amount of information 
recalled by children may increase but often becomes biased and inaccurate (Pipe, 
Gee & Wilson, 1993). Therefore it is necessary to find a method of prompting 
young children's memories which improves recall without introducing bias or 
. . 
1naccurac1es. 
Network theory (Bower, 1981) maintains that emotional states can be used as cues 
to enhance accurate recall. An emotion generated by the child themselves, may be 
less prone to experimenter bias than experimenter-introduced props and cues 
because the child does not rely on the experimenter's interaction for cues. The aim 
of the current study was to investigate the efficacy of two methods of mood 
induction to cue children's recall. 
Use of Probes and Props to Enhance Children's Recall 
When young children are interviewed within a clinical setting their cognitive 
capacities should allow them to accurately recall a narrative about their past 
experience. Between the ages of two and three, children's language skills develop 
quite rapidly, allowing them to become much more effective in communicating 
their ideas. By preschool age, most children can recall a personal event with a basic 
narrative structure (Hudson & Hagreen, 1987). Also by the age of three children 
talk about future and past events rather than express themselves about current 
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events only (Hudson, 1990). Although children's narratives become more elaborate 
and complex with age so that 5 year olds have the capacity to easily relate a 
narrative about a past personal event, young children typically fail to provide 
lengthy narratives. For example Pipe, Gee and Wilson (1993, p.25) questioned 5 
and 6 year old children about a complex event that was staged in the classroom ten 
days before. When children were asked what had happened their responses were 
brief for example, "We did a magic show." While the response in this example was 
accurate it did not provide any elaboration about the central event. 
The interactive learning model (Hudson, 1990) maintains that younger children 
actually rely on adults to prompt and guide their memories which explains why 
their free recall is limited. This model is based on Vygotsky's (1978) theory that all 
higher mental functions develop in the context of social interactions. The model 
posits that remembering is a joint interaction carried out between a parent and a 
child. The parent helps the child elicit information by asking direct questions such 
as, "Who was there?" or "Where did we go?" Gradually the child learns to prompt 
his/her own memory, internalise these cues, and form a self-regulated memory 
(Eisenberg, 1985; Lucariello & Nelson, 1987). It is only when a child recognises 
that remembering is important to others that he/she actively practices remembering 
without the use of external prompts. Until then, prompting the child may reduce 
the demands on the child by providing memory cues which enhance and guide their 
recall. 
Following from this model, verbal cues and questions have traditionally been used 
to enhance children's recall. To investigate the effects of free recall versus specific 
questioning on older children's ability to produce a detailed narrative, Dent and 
Stephenson (1979) undertook a study to obtain evidence from 10 and 11 year old 
a. 
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children. Children watched a brief colour film of a man stealing a parcel from a 
car. They were then asked to remember the film using one of the following forms 
of recall: free recall, general recall (for example "what happened to the man in the 
truck?"), and specific recall (for example "what colour hair did the man in the white 
truck have?"). Dent and Stephenson found that the children in the free recall 
condition produced highly accurate but incomplete reports. Children in the specific 
recall condition recalled more than twice as much information than children in 
either the free recall or general recall conditions, but specific questions resulted in 
significantly more inaccuracies. Thus even for older children free recall restricted 
the quantity of memories they could provide although these memories were very 
accurate. In contrast using specific questions enhanced recall but increased errors. 
Dale, Loftus & Rathbum (1978) showed that younger children's recall of an event 
could also be influenced by specific verbal questions. Four and five year old 
children watched four one-minute films and were asked a series of questions about 
them ten minutes following the last film. The questions were generated by a 
combination of positive and negative phrases ("Did you see ... ?" vs. "Didn't you 
see ... ?"), an article (the, a, any, or, some), and an item that was either present or 
absent in the film ( eg. "Did you see any elephants?", "Didn't you see the 
elephants?"). If children were asked about an item that did exist the wording of the 
question did not matter and most children responded correctly that they had 
observed the item. However when children were asked about an entity that was not 
present in the film, then the form of the question significantly affected the 
probability that they would report having seen the item. Dale et al (1978) found 
that the questions framed as "Did you see ~he ?", "Did you see any ?", and "Didn't 
you see some?" were more likely to be answered "yes" than other types of 
questions. Such responses indicated that children had incorporated the interviewer's 
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suggestions·into their memory of the event. This study showed that young children 
were aware of the expectations conveyed by certain linguistic forms, even subtle 
forms such as "the" suggested to the children that the interviewer was seeking a 
particular response. These mild verbal cues reduced the accuracy of the 
preschooler's responses indicating that interviewers must be very cautious when 
using verbal cues with young children. 
Despite this caution, there is some debate as to the magnitude of the effect verbal 
cues have on young children's recall. While some studies show that younger 
children are more susceptible to suggestive questions than older children (Ornstein, 
Gordon & Larus, 1992; Oates & Shrimpton, 1991) and that children in general are 
more susceptible to suggestion than adults (Cohen & Barnick, 1_980; King & Yuille, 
1987); there are also studies which have found younger children actually resist 
suggestion better than either older children or adults (Duncan, Whitney, & Kunen, 
1982; Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, 1979). Proponents of this view argue that 
younger children may resist leading questions because their memories of events 
remain unaltered. Younger children do not reflect on their memories, instead they 
are passive stores of information. At the age of six years, children begin to enter 
Piaget's concrete operations stage. At that point they can use specific mental 
operations to organise previously stored material. As comprehension develops, 
children modify their mental representations to conform to their new understanding 
(Penny & Wrightman, 1991) so that from six years of age, children are more likely 
than their younger counterparts to distort the original memory. Ceci and Bruck 
(1993) reviewed ten studies carried out over the past twenty years and concluded 
that the debate about younger children's degree of suggestibility could not be settled 
without further research. They noted that although each study provided evidence 
either for or against age differences in children's suggestibility, within each study 
i 
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there were also conflicting results. So although it appears that all children are 
influenced to some extent by verbal cues and questions which may reduce the 
accuracy of their recall, it is still unclear as to whether younger children are more 
suggestible. 
There are also other problems associated with using verbal cues and specific 
questions to conduct interviews with young children. Children of all ages will 
respond to meaningless or bizarre questions such as "Is red heavier than yellow?" if 
they are asked to do so by an authoritative experimenter (Pratt, 1990). Further 
exacerbating this problem is that children, and younger children in particular, rarely 
ask for clarification when they do not understand a question (Warren & McCloskey, 
1993). When an authoritative adult asks a series of direct questions a young child is 
likely to provide a series of responses but the validity of these responses is 
sometimes questionable. Together with the findings from the suggestive questions 
studies, these results suggest that while the amount of information provided by 
young children will increase when they are questioned with verbal probes, the 
accuracy of this information will decrease. 
To avoid the problems associated with verbal cues, non-verbal cues such as props 
or situational re-enactment have been used in interviews with young children. By 
using visual cues to prompt children's memories, specific verbal questions can be 
minimised or avoided. Props may enable young children to demonstrate their 
'--
knowledge of routine events such as going to bed or bathing, which they might 
otherwise find difficult because of their limited language (Pipe, Gee & Wilson, 
1993). In contrast situational re-enactment involves taking a child back to the 
original environment where an event occurred and this provides the child with 
accurate visual cues for the event and physical props which also assist the child to 
,1, 
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explain the event. Thus non-verbal cues may provide children with opportunities to 
extend their recall of events. 
Studies on the use of physical props have generally found that props, like verbal 
cues, can result in much more information being generated by the child, but that 
again the information often contains many more errors. Saywitz, Goodman, 
Nicholas and Moan (1991) found that when they asked 5 and 7 year old children to 
recall undergoing a medical exam by either (a) free recall, (b) by the use of 
anatomically correct dolls and model doctor instruments, or ( c) by direct 
questioning, re-enactment using the props resulted in twice as much recall. Yet the 
use of these props significantly increased children's error rates. The majority of 
these errors related to the props, for instance choosing incorrect medical 
instruments or the wrong number of dolls to re-enact the event. Roughly half the 
children included a tongue depressor in the re-enactment, which is common to 
many doctor's visits, but was not used in the experiment by Saywitz et al. 
Saywitz et al (1991) highlighted a particular problem associated with props, those 
which are introduced by the experimenter may be se~n by the child to have 
marginal relevance to the event. Irrelevant props, such as the tongue depressor, 
could have a suggestive function which misleads children into making errors in 
their reports as they attempt to incorporate the prop into their memory of the event 
(King & Yuille, 1987). However even relevant cues and props could miscue 
children, and prompt them to describe activities that are associated with the prop 
item but irrelevant to the topic of interest (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). 
Because of these problems props are rarely useful in interviewing young children. 
Situational re-enactment may avoid some of these problems. Smith, Ratner and 
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Hobart (1987) showed that re-enactment significantly enhanced children's recall 
without increasing error rates in their reports. Kindergarten children were shown 
how to make clay and then asked to describe what they had done, first in free recall, 
and then in one of three retrieval conditions. In the control condition children 
simply described again what had happened. In the second condition the original 
utensils and ingredients for clay-making were visually displayed but not physically 
accessible and the children were asked to recall how they made the clay. In the 
third condition the children were asked to re-make the clay and describe the 
procedure as they did so. When the visual objects were present, children recalled 
about 20% of the actions they had produced, the same as children in the free recall 
condition. However children in the re-enactment condition recalled over 80% of 
their actions which was significantly more than the number recalled by children in 
either of the other two conditions. Furthermore error rates were low across the 
three conditions (<I% of total recall) and were not significantly affected by the 
experimental conditions. 
Smith et al maintained that children did not fully encode events in a verbal form 
and that reconstructing the action was necessary for children to demonstrate their 
full knowledge of the event. Viewing the ingredients and utensils selected by the 
experimenter may have provided cues about what they used to make the clay but 
did not provide sufficient cues about how they made the clay. By re-enacting the 
event, children were also able to prompt the memories of their actions. All three 
conditions allowed the children to select their own cues from the original set of 
cues, avoiding the problem of bias or distortion from experimenter introduced cues. 
Had an experimenter selected a set of cues approximating the original event, the 
relevance of the cue would have been uncertain and the child's ability to select 
amongst cues restricted, making errors likely. This study showed firstly that re-
1111 
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enactment of an event improved recall over free recall or visual cues. Secondly this 
study showed that self-generated cues did not increase error rates. One problem 
with situational re-enactment is that it is not always possible to re-visit the exact 
location or environment where events have occurred. Consequently this technique 
would be difficult to apply to clinical interviews with children. 
In summary the results of the free recall studies show young children are restricted 
in their ability to generate information from their memories. They rely on adult 
interaction for memory prompts and may not use self-produced strategies or cues to 
assist their memories. Unfortunately when verbal prompts or visual props are 
offered by the experimenter, children's recall of details increases, but the recall also 
become less accurate. In contrast, self-generated cuing techniques, such as 
situational re-enactment, allow the child to generate his/her own cues which 
improved accurate recall without the associated increase in errors. Situational re-
enactment however, is not practically applicable to most clinical interviews with 
children. Alternative methods of cuing which allow the child to cue their own 
memories rather than rely on experimenter cues need to be explored. Network 
theory (Bower, 1981) suggests that emotional material is encoded with memories 
and that emotional re-enactment could prompt memories without effecting error 
rates. 
Network Theory 
The Network theory of memory was developed by Bower (1981) and his colleagues 
(Bower, 1987; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Bower & Mayer, 1989). The theory 
maintains that thoughts and memories operate within a semantic network of inter-
related units of propositions and concepts. A memory for a single event is a 
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discrete cluster of units or nodes linked to represent a verbal narrative of the event. 
This semantic narrative is overlayed with nodes of sensory information from the 
sensory organs as well as emotions and other internal physical sensations such as 
movements and balance. 
Associative connections between these nodes are established which vary 1n 
strength, depending on how closely the descriptors relate to one another. These 
connections not only exist between the nodes of a particular event in memory, but 
also between related nodes from other events in the memory network. For example 
consider the event where Sam lost his toy aeroplane and this made him feel sad. An 
event could be created in Sam's memory with the concepts of loss, toy, aeroplane 
and sadness linked by associative connections. There may also be weaker 
connections between that event and other related events in Sam's memory about 
toys, aeroplanes or feeling sad. 
Thoughts occur via the activation of nodes and their associated connections within 
the semantic network. This activation can be triggered by either external cues from 
the environment or internal cues such as ideas. Once activated, a node further 
transmits activation to related nodes depending on the strength of existing 
connections so that one idea can activate a number of related concepts in the 
network. 
Retrieval from the memory network also occurs by fallowing associations from 
some stimulus cue. Activation stems from the stimulus cue but dissipates as it 
spreads over many pathways so that closely connected nodes may be strongly 
activated, while nodes with weaker connections may receive less or no activation. 
Each node must reach some threshold of excitation for it to reach conscious 
•1 
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awareness. Some nodes will be activated by way of the spreading activation but 
may not be sufficiently activated to break the threshold for consciousness. Bower 
(1987) suggested that the spreading activation is like the flow of electrical current 
in a circuit network, and ideas are like light-bulb terminals that "light-up" and 
become conscious when they accumulate enough activation. This explains why 
most memories are only partly retrieved since not all parts of the memory will be 
sufficiently activated in either children or adults. 
The Network theory explains how cues function to prompt and enhance the recall of 
children's memories. Bower suggested that in general retrieval from the network 
involved searches emanating from at least two nodes in a cluster. If retrieval could 
occur through activation of a single node then one's consciousness would be 
constantly flooded with ideas from even simple thoughts or emotional states. The 
activation from two or more nodes, though, could summate to sufficiently arouse 
connected nodes and bring ideas into consciousness. In a free recall paradigm 
young children's recall may be limited because they lack strategies to cue a 
sufficient number of nodes and cannot bring memories into conscious awareness. 
However cues would assist children by adding activation to the network and 
increasing to the arousal of the event which is to be remembered. 
Consider a cued recall paradigm where a relevant prop is used to enhance a child's 
memory. The child's attempt to cue the memory alone might be limited by a lack of 
available strategies. However the combined activation from the child's attempt at 
remembering plus the activation caused by the prop, would cause some nodes to 
reach the threshold of consciousness and be remembered. Without the added 
activation from the cue these nodes of information would remain otherwise 
unremembered and this is how cues can facilitate recall. However if a prop chosen 
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by the experimenter was not relevant to the child, it might introduce errors in the 
child's recall as he/she attempted to incorporate the cue into their memories thereby 
changing their memory to accommodate the cue (Dale et al., 1979). Cues deemed 
irrelevant to the to-be-remembered event might also increase errors by stimulating 
the child's memory of the wrong events. Such a cue might activate nodes in the 
network about events which were related to the cue but not to the event in question. 
While the research on Network Theory has largely focused on adult subjects, a 
study by Rovee-Collier and Hayne (1987) showed that visual cues can activate even 
infant's memories. Three-month old infants were taught to move a mobile by 
kicking a string tied to their leg. When they saw the mobile again they 
"remembered" how to move the mobile for up to 8 days on average, but by two 
weeks they appeared to have "forgotten" and looked at the stationary mobile, but 
did not kick. However if after a two week interval the infant was shown the mobile 
when it was moving, rather than stationary, they then "remembered" how to move it 
and re-instigated the kicking action. Rovee-Collier and Hayne concluded that the 
memory was not lost, however it needed a stronger cue than the stationary mobile 
to activate it. An associated visual cue, the moving mobile, re-activated the 
physical memory of kicking demonstrating that visual and motor perceptions are 
linked together in the memories of infant. 
Another study using older children also provided support for Network theory 
(Parker, 1995). Six and ten year old children were read action vignettes which 
either involved interaction with a confederate or passive listening of the vignette. 
After two weeks children of both ages better remembered the vignettes in which 
they had performed actions rather than just listened to the vignette and imagined the 
actions. Parker suggested that the event involving real physical action had caused 
u1 
I 
I 
I 
Ii 
,~: 
Improving children's recall of a personal event page 12 
more sensory activation (and therefore greater network arousal) than passive 
listening. More network pathways were then activated at encoding with strong 
connections established between these pathways. At recall overlays of sensory 
experiences were activated causing greater arousal of the cluster and better recall of 
' 
the event. Overall there is evidence to support Network theory in infants and six 
and ten year olds suggesting Network theory can be applied across developmental 
levels of childhood. 
The Role of Emotion in the Memory Network 
Since Network theory maintains that the nodes from a memory of an event are 
overlayed with nodes of sensory information, emotions and physical movements, 
any of these nodes could act to cue the verbal. Network theory maintains that 
emotion may be a particularly useful cue for enhancing the recall of past because of 
the way it functions at recall compared to other nodes. 
Gilligan and Bower (1984) maintained that emotion nodes function like other nodes 
in the network with a few exceptions. First, emotions are more prone to internal 
activation than semantic nodes in particular. All nodes in the network, including 
emotion nodes can be activated by internal thoughts. Emotion nodes are also 
directly connected to other emotion nodes, facial muscles and levels of autonomic 
arousal. Thus emotions may be more easily aroused through internal processes, 
such as the imagining or acting of emotions, than other nodes. Second, once 
activated, emotion. nodes stay aroused for some time until a natural dampening 
process occurs. The persistent arousal results in ongoing activation of the network 
and increases the chance that related concepts will also be aroused. Such 
persistence does not usually occur through activation of a simple thought or idea 
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which generally disappears from working memory once the idea is replaced by a 
new one. Third, once past a threshold and "turned on", emotion nodes can send 
more "voltage" to surrounding nodes than simple concept nodes. This would cause 
an emo_tion to gain greater control than a thought over the direction and content of 
subsequent thoughts or memories. Therefore emotions may be more easily 
activated by a subject and thereby reduce the reliance on external cues. 
Furthermore, once activated, emotion nodes play a stronger cuing role than other 
semantic nodes. 
Emotion can also play a useful role in cuing recall because researchers maintain that 
there are a discrete number of basic emotions which occur across cultures and 
combine to form complex emotional states (Plutchik, 1980a; 1980b ). For example 
Plutchik (1980a) proposed the following eight primary categories of emotion which 
could be represented in a circle with related emotions adjacent to one another and 
contrasting emotions opposite one another: joy, acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, 
disgust, anger and anticipation. For visual stimuli there may be infinite instances in 
one's memory and an interviewer would need a huge set of visual props to match 
these stimuli. For emotional stimuli there exists a finite set of basic emotions 
which are associated in various combinations with each event in our memory. Thus 
there is also a set of basic emotional cues available to activate, isolate and recall 
information from our memory network. 
Gilligan and Bower (1984) offered four hypotheses to explain how emotion 
affected memory and other cognitive processes. First, they hypothesised that an 
individual's memory for an event would be enhanced if their mood during recall 
matched their original mood at the time of learning (mood-state-dependent recall). 
Thus if an individual were happy when he/she first experienced an event their recall 
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of that event would be best when they were in a happy mood. Second, they 
hypothesised that cognitive processes were likely to be congruent to mood (thought 
congruency). That is an individual's free associations, interpretations, thoughts, and 
snap-judgements would rely on the existing mood state with happy people more 
likely to make positive interpretations and judgements of events. Third, they 
hypothesised that emotionally toned information would be learned best when there 
was correspondence between its affective value and the learner's current mood state 
(mood-congruent learning). Thus an individual in a happy mood would be more 
likely to encode and learn positively valanced items while sad individuals would be 
more attuned to negative items. Fourth, was the hypothesis of mood intensity which 
stated that an increase in intensity of mood would cause an increase in the 
activation of the associated nodes in the network. Thus an intense mood would 
result in greater activation of the network than a subdued mood. 
Gilligan and Bower ( 1984) found evidence to support the four hypotheses with 
adults (see also Bower, 1987; Bower, 1981). The support for the hypotheses of 
thought congruency and mood-congruent learning highlight the importance of 
emotion in the network and highlight that reciprocal pathways exist between 
emotion and cognition. Emotion is not only a product of thoughts, in tum it can 
also influence thought processes such as perception, attention, and learning. The 
hypotheses of mood-state dependent learning and mood intensity are of particular 
importance to enhancing recall and will be discussed in some detail. 
The first hypothesis (mood-state-dependent learning), that a matching mood state at 
learning and recall can enhance the retrieval process, is a well established finding 
(Bower, 1981 ). Bower proposed that emotional states at retrieval function as 
memory cues by spreading activation to related emotion nodes as well as to the 
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associated concept nodes. These nodes therefore become partially aroused prior to 
recall. When an individual attempts to retrieve these memories they are more easily 
aroused into consciousness because of the added activation brought about by the 
emotion. In this way emotional states can enhance the recall of past emotional 
events. However Bower also hypothesised that a competing emotional state would 
inhibit retrieval. First, because the competing mood would fail to activate concepts 
related to the to-be-remembered event and second, because the mood would 
activate other memories associated with the competing mood which would interfere 
with the retrieval of the event. 
For example, Bower, Monteiro and Gilligan (1978) undertook a study employing a 
hypnotic design to show the mood-state-dependent learning effect. Six groups of 
hypnotised adult subjects learned List A (16 words long) while either happy or sad. 
They then learned List B (16 words long) again while happy or sad, and finally 
were asked to recall List A in either a happy or sad emotion condition. 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of what has come to be a traditional design, where 
control subjects learned and recalled both lists in a single mood. In the facilitation 
condition, marked by plus signs, the subjects learned List A in one mood, learned 
List B in a different mood, and were asked to recall List A in their original mood. 
In the inhibition condition, marked by minus signs, the subjects learned list A and B 
in different moods, and were then asked to recall List A in the mood opposite to 
their original mood. Bower predicted that learning the lists in different moods 
isolated them in the memory network. Subjects in the facilitation condition would 
have enhanced recall of List A because of the match in mood at encoding and 
retrieval and reduced interference from List B which was learned in a competing 
mood state. The inhibition condition would subsequently restrict the quantity of 
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recall because a competing emotional state had been employed at recall, triggering 
competing memory descriptors. 
Mood-State-Dependent Recall 
Learn A Learn B 
Sad ------------------------> 
HAPPY Happy ---------------------> 
Sad ---------------------> 
Happy ---------------------> 
SAD Sad ---------------------> 
Happy ---------------------> 
Test A 
Happy(+) 
Happy (0) 
Sad(-) 
Sad(+) 
Sad (0) 
Happy(-) 
Figure I. Diagram of design employed by Bower (1981 ). Plus signs designate the facilitation 
condition, minus signs designate the inhibition condition, and zeroes the control condition. 
As predicted mood-state-dependent recall was obtained since recall of information 
was substantially improved in the facilitation condition. There was a 75-80% 
retention rate when information was learned and recalled in the same mood state for 
the happy and sad conditions respectively. Only 45% of the list was remembered 
when the inhibition condition was employed regardless of the emotion. Controls 
remembered approximately 55%. The results showed that information learned in 
one emotional state was better retrieved when the state was re-experienced under 
hypnosis while recall was reduced when the opposite mood was re-experienced. 
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The study by Bower et al (1978) showed that both a happy and sad mood state 
affected retrieval. Thompson ( cited in Bower, 1981) demonstrated that the mood-
state-dependent learning effect also existed for fear and anger. Subjects were 
hypnotised and taught four different word lists, each under one of four emotional 
states, happiness, sadness, anger or fear. After induction of a specific mood 
subjects learned one list, then their mood was switched and they were given a new 
word list to learn. After studying the four lists, the subjects' recall was tested for 
each list while the subjects were in one of four moods: the same mood that they 
had learned the list in, the opposite mood or one of two adjacent moods (according 
to Plutchik's categories of emotion). 
When subjects were induced into a mood that was the same as that at learning, 
retention of the list was very high (85%). When subjects recall was tested in a 
mood state adjacent to the original mood (for existence learnt in a happy mood and 
recalled in an angry mood), recall was somewhat reduced (70%) and when subjects 
were tested in the mood opposite to their original mood state, recall was lowest 
(54%). Thompson concluded that specific emotional states had affected retrieval 
since recall was best when the mood at recall and encoding matched identically, and 
that different emotional states functioned as discrete nodes in the memory network. 
Bower (1981) acknowledged that these results supported Plutchik's proposition of 
primary emotional states and showed that the semantic network may also be 
ordered according to these categories of emotion. 
While the category of emotional experience must be matched at retrieval to 
optimise subjects' recall the intensity of the emotional state may also need to be 
matched for optimal recall (Gilligan and Bower, 1984). Gilligan and Bower (1984) 
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supplied experimental evidence to show that mood intensity resulted in quantitative 
changes to the network, with intense moods yielding greater activation overall than 
mild moods. They also proposed but did not test, that the intensity of an emotion 
also involved qualitative changes to the encoding of the emotional experience. For 
each emotion there are nodes of varying levels of intensity. For example an 
emotion such as anger could be experienced in levels of varying intensity, 
progressing from annoyance to anger to rage and an individual would associate 
different events and behaviours with each level of the emotion (Gilligan & Bower, 
1984, p. 577). They proposed three types of emotion nodes defined by their level of 
intensity: low, moderate or high. 
Moderate nodes operate as the primary emotion nodes. They become activated 
when a moderate level of mood is experienced. They are connected to low and 
high intensity nodes and activate these when either low or high levels of excitation 
are received. High and low intensity nodes are also linked, but with inhibitory 
connections, so that when intense arousal such as rage occurs the annoyance or low 
intensity emotion nodes are switched off. 
The intensity of emotion experienced during the encoding of an emotional event 
defines what type of emotion node will be encoded with the event and determines 
what threshold of arousal will be required at recall to achieve activation of that 
node. Thus rage and annoyance are discrete nodes in the memory network and 
memories related to each emotion would only be aroused by re-experiencing an 
emotion approximating rage or annoyance respectively. This hypothesis also 
maintains that a mood state which matches in type but not in approximate intensity 
would not enhance recall of an emotional experience. A mild mood state would not 
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enhance the recall of a moderate or intense emotional experience nor would an 
intense mood state enhance the recall of a mild emotional experience. 
No experimental studies have yet been done to investigate the refined mood 
intensity hypothesis of Gilligan and Bower however the hypothesis poses difficulty 
for experimenters and interviewers alike who may want to improve a child's recall 
of a past event without knowing the exact nature of the original emotional 
experience. Inducing the wrong type or intensity of mood may have two effects 
according to Network theory. First the retrieval of the event in question would not 
be enhanced and may even be inhibited if an opposite mood type or mood intensity 
were induced. Second the child's retrieval of other events may be enhanced so that 
he/she recalls the wrong event. The challenge is to find a method of mood 
induction which removes the interviewer's responsibility to induce the mood and 
instead allows the child to induce his/her own mood state and to identify the 
category and intensity of the mood state themselves. 
Overall Network theory proposes that emotions should significantly enhance recall 
of past events. Emotional states are likely to exist in finite categories within the 
network, so that a discrete number of states can be used as cues. Emotional states 
can be easily activated by individuals and once activated have a stronger effect on 
the network than other types of nodes so that emotion may operate as a stronger cue 
than verbal or visual prompts. There are two considerations . with the use of 
emotional states in mood-state-dependent paradigms. First emotion has been 
effectively shown to enhance adult's recall of past events provided the emotion was 
perceived to have caused the event (Bower, 1987). Second, recall might be 
optimised if the intensity of the mood at recall closely approximates the intensity of 
the mood at encoding. 
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Methods of Mood Induction used with Children 
A range of techniques for mood induction has been used with adult subjects and 
shown to successfully achieve a mood state and subsequently enhance recall of 
emotional memories. The methods of mood induction used with adults apart from 
hypnosis have included reading a list of emotional statements (Velten, 1968), 
situational mood induction (Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978), and imagery 
(Qualls, 1982). There are also several studies in the literature which show that 
naturally occurring mood states such as clinical depression generate sufficient 
emotional arousal in the memory network of adults to improve recall of congruently 
valanced emotional events (Bullington, 1991; Clark & Teasdale, 1985). 
In contrast, there are only a few studies investigating mood induction techniques 
with children. One study used situational mood induction with their subjects. Two 
studies have shown imagery techniques to achieve a mood state in children and 
another tested three novel methods of mood induction, labelling the emotional state, 
forming a facial expression, and re-enacting the emotional state. 
Bartlett and Santrock (1979) used short stories as a method of situational mood 
induction with five year old children. Children heard three happy stories or three 
sad stories. Each story had six emotional words, both happy and sad, subsumed in 
it. After hearing the stories children were asked to re-tell them. The dependent 
variable was the six critical words to be recalled, but the experimenter did not 
actively cue the children to the words. The results showed that both the happy and 
sad stories affected children's recall. Children who heard the happy story recalled 
more happy than sad words while children who heard the sad story recalled more 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
ll: 
JI'. 
I 
11, 
Improving children's recall of a personal event page 21 
sad than happy words. The effect was weaker for the sad words in the sad stories 
compared to the effect of the happy words in the happy stories, but overall mood 
manipulation at encoding was shown to improve later recall of emotional items. So 
reading a story at encoding was shown to be a successful method of mood induction 
for happy, and to a lesser extent sad memories. However using a story ·at retrieval 
to induce a mood state and enhance recall of a past event (mood-state-dependent 
learning) would rely on the experimenter to choose a story matching the child's 
original mood type and mood intensity. As discussed, one danger of experimenter 
introduced cues is they may be seen as irrelevant by the child and cause bias and 
errors in recall. 
Other studies have used imagery to' induce a mood at retrieval and effect past recall. 
Imagery techniques allow the subject to generate their own emotional state by 
asking subjects to remember a life event with strong emotional connotations. In 
doing so subjects may be able to closely match the type and intensity of the 
emotional states at encoding and recall by choosing images that elicit similar 
emotional reactions. 
Bartlett, Burleson and Santrock (1982) used imagery either with or without 
relaxation as a method of mood induction for a group of kindergarteners and a 
· group of third graders. In experiment one children were asked to undergo a 
relaxation procedure and then imagine an experience that had previously made them 
feel happy or sad. In experiment two the relaxation procedure was omitted. In both 
experiments children were read a list of neutral words following the imagery task. 
An interference condition then followed in which children were asked to imagine an 
experience that induced the opposite mood, after which they learned a second list of 
words. Following a ten minute delay the children were asked to imagine a final 
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emotional experience which made them feel either happy or sad. Half the children 
were instructed to imagine the same type of experience as at encoding and half were 
instructed to imagine the opposite type. The children were then asked to recall as 
many items as they could from both lists. When relaxation was omitted recall was 
significantly enhanced by the mood states. Children recalled the most words from 
the list learned in the emotional state that matched their mood at retrieval. Children 
whose mood at retrieval was opposite to the mood at encoding recalled significantly 
fewer words from either of the lists. 
Bartlett et al had hypothesised that relaxation would facilitate the process of mood 
induction but this was not found. Relaxation actually resulted in a milder mood 
being experienced by the children and consequently had no effect on recall. Bower 
(1981) suggested that a fairly intense emotional experience was required to activate 
the associated emotions in the memory network. By dampening the intensity of the 
mood using relaxation, the children's rnood was not intense enough to activate 
associated memories to consciousness. 
Nasby and Yando (1982) also used imagery as a method of mood induction to 
enhance children's recall. Fifth grade boys and girls imagined a personal 
experience that made the child feel either "really happy" or "really sad". They then 
learned a list of positive and negative words. The children's mood was manipulated 
again at retrieval to produce either a positive or negative mood by asking children 
to recall a second emotional event. The effects of mood at encoding and retrieval 
were examined separately. A happy mood compared to a neutral mood at encoding 
facilitated later recall of positive words. A happy mood during retrieval also 
facilitated recall of positive words. Nasby and Yando did not find a significant 
mood-state-dependency result since congruent encoding and retrieval moods did 
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not produce superior recall to when mood manipulation occurred only at encoding 
or retrieval. Provided either the encoding or the retrieval mood matched the items 
to be remembered, recall was enhanced, which provides support for mood-
congruent learning. However this study showed children could use imagery to 
induce a mood state and effect recall. 
These two studies showed imagery to be a useful tool for inducing a mood in 
children and improving their recall. However both the above studies only related to 
immediate recall. In clinical interviews the recall of recently learned items is not 
often of interest, as it is usually the recall of past events that is required. Li wag and 
Stein (1995) used three different methods of mood induction to test children's recall 
of events that had happened two weeks before. 
Liwag and Stein (1995) investigated three and five year old children's ability to 
recall four different real life emotional events in which they had experienced either 
of happiness, sadness, anger and fear respectively. These events were obtained 
through previous interviews with the parents in which they were asked to recall four 
different situations over the past two weeks where they had observed their child 
experiencing each one of the four emotions. In the experimental interview children 
were asked to recall each event using either free recall (the control condition) or one 
of the three mood-induction techniques. In the first experimental condition the 
children were asked to simply identify and label the emotion they had experienced 
during the event and then recall the episode. For the second condition children 
were asked to identify their emotion and then to make a facial expression 
corresponding to that emotion before being asked to recall the event. In the third 
condition children were asked to identify their emotion, make a facial expression, 
and then to reinstate their original emotions as they recalled the event. Children in 
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this re-enactment condition were instructed to re-tell the event and to, "act like you 
are feeling (child's emotion eg. happy) just like you were when (precipitating event) 
happened." The third condition therefore included some aspects of imagery since 
children were required to imagine their original mood before acting it out. Like 
imagery, it also relied on the child's rather than the experimenter's perception of the 
emotional experience. 
The children in the emotional reinstatement condition significantly outperformed 
the children in the other conditions on measures of recall. They recalled almost 
twice as many phrases relevant to the event compared to the children in the other 
experimental conditions. This occurred for the recall of happy, sad, angry and 
fearful memories, although children recalled significantly more information about 
happy memories. Emotional re-enactment did not appear to increase the number of 
the errors in children's recall although Liwag and Stein (1995) had no objective 
measure of accuracy so they could not address this issue directly. They compared 
the children's recall with that of their parent's recall of the same events. Thus the 
study only measured similarity in recall. This is an important limitation as it must 
be shown that any technique for improving children's recall does not also increase 
children's recall of inaccurate information. 
Yet Liwag and Stein's (1995) study was the only study on children which 
approximated the conditions of a clinical interview. Children in Liwag and Stein's 
study were asked to recall a personally experienced event whereas other studies 
asked children to recall word lists rather than personal events. Learning a list 
would result in more intentional learning by children than would occur in a real life 
situation. In Liwag and Stein's study the learning was incidental and mood 
induction still enhanced children's recall for the event. The study's time frame for 
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recall also approximated clinical conditions where children were asked to recall an 
event which had occurred up to two weeks previously. This showed that when 
mood induction was achieved in children, it facilitated recall of long term rather 
than short term memories. 
Finally the study introduced emotional re-enactment as a strategy that children 
could use to prompt their own memories by using their original emotional state as a 
cue. The imagery technique used by Bartlett et al (1982) and Nasby and Yando 
(1982) involved different imagined events being generated at encoding and 
retrieval. This must have resulted in an approximate match between emotional 
states at encoding and retrieval in the above studies since children's recall in the 
emotionally congruent conditions was increased. However using a related event to 
prompt a memory relies on the child's ability to choose an imaginary event which 
reflects both the type and intensity of mood for that memory. A more reliable 
method for activating the network would be to base the mood state on the original 
emotional state as was achieved through the re-enactment techniques of Liwag and 
Stein (1995). 
Liwag and Stein found no support for the two other methods of mood induction. 
Neither having recreated the appropriate facial expression nor labelling the emotion 
they had previously experienced improved children's recall compared to the control 
group. Liwag and Stein suggested these two methods did not arouse a sufficiently 
intense mood state in their 3 and 5 year old subjects to enhance recall. 
Although the study by Liwag and Stein (1995) did not find support for facial 
expression as a method of mood induction in children, they did not examine if there 
were age differences between 3 and 5 year old children. Huttenlocker and Smiley 
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(1990) showed that at about 2 1/2 years children began to describe other people as 
subjects of experience, and to understand that others have internal states similar to 
their own. Thus at 2 1/2 children are just learning to equate facial expressions with 
emotions. Stein and Levine (1989) maintain that age three is a time when children 
) 
are rapidly developing concepts of self and of others, and a further understanding of 
the relation _between internal and external concepts should develop along with this 
social knowledge. It is not until at least the age of four that children learn to 
reliably distinguish various emotional terms and express their knowledge about 
different emotional states (Stein & Levine, 1989). Thus a five year old may easily 
relate their facial expressions to emotions whereas a three year old might not be 
able to use expression to arouse internal emotional states. 
There is support for facial expression as a method of mood induction in adults. 
-Laird, Cuniff, Sheehan, Shulman and Strum (1991) instructed subjects to adopt a 
facial expression using a step-by-step procedure to avoid subjects guessing the 
purpose of the task. Once the facial expression had been constructed, subjects were 
presented with a neutral word, for example house, tree, or water and asked to recall 
a personal event of their choice. Subjects who posed in a smile later rated their 
memories and emotional state as positive and subjects who adopted an angry pose 
rated their memories and emotion as angry. This study showed that facial 
expression could trigger emotional memories in the subjects and might be applied 
to memory enhancement. 
Laird, Wagener, Halal, and Szegda, (1982) directly investigated the effects of facial 
expression on recall by asking subjects to read either an anger-provoking editorial 
or a humorous selection by Woody Allen. Later one selection was recalled while 
frowning and the other while smiling. Recall was significantly better for the angry 
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editorials when frowning, and for the humorous selection while smiling. This study 
showed that for adults, facial expression induced a mood state which could effect 
recall. 
So in adults facial expressions appears to be closely associated with emotional 
reactions. Although emotions usually generate facial expressions in everyday life, 
rather than vice versa, facial expressions have successfully been used to elicit 
emotional sensations and accompanying physiological change. Bower (1987) 
maintained that facial expression affects mood because the two are closely 
associated in the memory network. Although the study by Liwag & Stein (1995) 
found no facilitative effect for facial expression with children, they did not examine 
age differences between the three and five year olds. There may be a 
developmental shift in the ability to relate facial expressions to internal emotional 
states which occurs around four years of age. Therefore facial expression may be a 
method of mood induction that five year old children could use as a memory cue. 
Limitations to the Effects of Mood on Memory 
In the literature on mood-congruent memory, there is an asymmetry in the level of 
effect observed for positive and negative moods, with positive mood generally 
showing a stronger effect on the recall of mood-congruent memories (Blaney, 1986; 
Isen, 1984; Ucros, 1989). Adult memories are retrieved faster (Teasdale & Fogarty, 
1979), and are richer (Salovey & Singer, 1991) when happiness rather than sadness 
is employed in mood-congruency studies. 
The three studies examining the effects of mood on children's memory also reported 
an asymmetry in the results for positive and negative mood. Nasby and Yando 
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(1982) demonstrated a mood-congruent effect for recall by a group of 108 fifth 
grade boys and girls where mood induction was achieved through imagining a past 
happy or sad experience. If children were happy in the retrieval condition they 
recalled more happy than neutral or sad words, however sadness at retrieval did not 
result in more sad words being recalled. Liwag and Stein (1995) also reported 
happiness had the strongest effect on recall compared to sadness, anger and fear 
although the relative effects of each mood state were not reported. Bartlett and 
Santrock ( 1979) found the same asymmetry in their experiment on mood and 
learning in kindergarteners. Furthermore Bartlett et al (1982) found it was harder to 
successfully induce a sad mood than a happy mood in five year old children using 
stories. 
Isen (1984) suggested sadness and other negative emotions do not enhance recall 
because most people try to avoid or defend against negative emotions and will resist 
using negative emotions as retrieval cues. To avoid experiencing sadness people 
tend to engage in "mood repair" which results in the cognitive and emotional 
experience of a negative mood being much more complex than that of a positive 
mood. There can be various behavioural consequences of negative mood, for 
instance negative mood may produce negative thoughts and emotional reactions 
through associations within the memory network. Alternatively neutral thoughts 
and emotions may arise as a result of the person attempting to overcome the 
negative mood with competing positive thoughts. Finally, if the attempt at "mood 
repair" is intense the original negative mood could even result in a positive 
cognitions and emotions. Since people resist negative emotional experiences the 
network associative connections between negative memories are likely to be weaker 
due to their reduced use and this may cause further difficulties at retrieval. 
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Consequently there are many difficulties associated with inducing negative moods 
in subjects. Negative moods may still enhance the recall of negative memories but 
the effect is likely to be weaker than for positive mood. 
Summary and Hypotheses 
When interviewing children about past events, adults !Ilay not be aware of what 
actually happened and rely on the child for their full understanding of the event. 
Therefore it is important that the child's account is both as complete and as accurate 
as possible. Unfortunately young children have difficulty supplying complete 
accounts in free recall conditions (Pipe et al, 1993). Since the interviewer may not 
know what actually happened, any cues introduced by the interviewer may be only 
marginally relevant to the child's memory for the event and therefore may bias their 
responses and increase errors (Dale et al, 1978; Saywitz et al, 1991 ). Thus there is a 
need to explore methods of cuing which the child can generate themselves so they 
are not biased by the experimenter's suggestions and the low error rates associated 
with free recall can be maintained. 
Network theory maintains that the memory is an inter-connected network so that 
internally generated cues can be used to enhance recall from related parts of the 
network. Emotion has been found to be an effective memory cue with both adults 
(Ucros, 1989; Blaney, 1986) and children (Liwag & Stein, 1995; Bartlett et al, 
1982; Nasby & Y ando, 1982) with both able to induce an appropriate emotional 
state that appears to match the original emotional experience in category and 
intensity. Emotional congruence should not introduce errors to the child's recall 
because it does not rely on interaction between the child and the experimenter, since 
children can induce a mood state alone. Other reasons to use emotions as a cue to 
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improve children's memories of events when in a clinical setting are first, that there 
are thought to be a discrete set of emotions (Plutchik, 1980a; 1980b) so that 
subjects can easily isolate the category of their emotional experience. Second 
emotions are easily activated by individuals and once activated have a stronger 
effect on the network than other types of nodes (Gilligan & Bower, 1984). 
One goal of the current research was to test the efficacy of emotional re-enactment 
to increase the amount of details children recalled about a real life event above what 
they provided through free recall. This technique was previously employed by 
Liwag and Stein (1995) and could be applied to clinical interviews with children. 
Emotional re-enactment relies on the child to generate his or her own mood and 
therefore should avoid contamination from the experimenter. Liwag and Stein 
(1995) reported that emotional re-enactment enhanced children's recall and the 
current study expected to replicate this finding. The main goal of the current 
research was to provide direct and objective measures of the accuracy of children's 
recall using emotional re-enactment as a retrieval strategy by employing a 
controlled event as the target for recall. If cues are to be used in clinical interviews 
they must be shown to maintain the accuracy of _children's recall however this could 
not be achieved with the design used by Liwag and Stein. 
A second method of mood-induction, forming a facial expression, was also tested in 
the current study to determine whether it had any effect on children's recall. 
Although Liwag and Stein (1995) did not find support for facial expression as a 
method of mood induction with a group of three and five year old children, there 
may have been age differences in this ability as many three year old children may 
not have fully developed an ability to relate facial expressions to their own internal 
emotional state. Five year old children may be able to use this strategy to prompt 
1·· 
, ..
I 
i 
111 C 
Improving children's recall of a personal event page 31 
their memories. This research investigated whether facial expression would 
improve five year old children's recall of a real-life event. 
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Method 
Subjects 
Ninety-six kindergarten children who had received parental consent to participate 
were recruited from three primary schools in the Australian Capital Territory. Of 
the original 96 children who participated in the pre-test, 56 children, 28 males and 
28 females, met all the pre-test criteria and participated in the experimental 
interview. These children ranged in age from 4.75 years to 6.5 years (M = 5.50, SD 
= 0.34). The large rate of exclusion from the experimental interview was mainly 
due to the children having read the story previously. Thirty children were excluded 
from the experimental interview for this reason. Ten other children were excluded 
during the pre-test and experimental interviews. 
The percentage of children whose parents consented to their participation in the 
study was very high amongst the schools, 85% (School A), 70% (School B), and 
83% (School C). 
Design 
I 
There were three levels of one independent variable, which was the recall strategy 
used (free recall, facial expression, emotional re-enactment). The dependent 
variable was each child's recall ( direct, associated, or non-informative) of a story 
which was measured by breaking each narrative into discrete clauses and comparing 
those against the original story. 
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Procedure· 
At Time 1, three days prior to the experimental interviews, a research assistant 
dressed in a clown suit arrived for a surprise visit to the kindergarten classroom. 
The clown showed the children some balloons which she had brought and set them 
aside for distribution at the end of the day by the teacher. The clown's visit and the 
gift of the balloons were designed to invoke a feeling of happiness in the children, 
so the clown acted in a friendly, cheerful manner throughout her stay in the 
classroom. She then chatted with the children as a group before sitting down to 
read the children the story, Bamboozled by David Legge. The story was chosen 
because of its silly and amusing pictures and text. This matching between the mood 
induced in the children and the emotional valance of the story was expected to 
facilitate encoding of the material as Bower ( 1981) showed that we attend to stimuli 
in our environment which match our current mood state. The children would attend 
to this "happy" story because it matched their "happy" state. There were a large 
number of unusual drawings on each page, so that a young child would have 
difficulty attending to every picture, and thereby reduce the likelihood of any child 
remembering the full story, thus avoiding ceiling effects in recall. 
The story was read in an interactive fashion, so that the clown asked and 
encouraged the children to participate both verbally and physically in the story by 
identifying and pointing out two particular items from each page. The children's 
active involvement in the story was designed to closely approximate a real-life 
experience rather than a passive reading of the story. The clown stayed in the 
classroom for approximately 25 minutes and departed following the story. 
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Immediately following the clown's departure, the experimenter intervie\\t·ed each 
child individually and administered a pre-test on emotion face-labelling to ascertain 
whether he/she could accurately label and differentiate their own internal emotions 
as well as engage in the mood induction techniques used in this study. Liwag and 
Stein ( 1995) conducted the pre-test just prior to their experimental interview so that 
it was unclear whether the pre-test had affected the emotional state of children in 
the control condition, who were presumed to be of neutral emotion. This problem 
was eliminated in the current study by conducting the pre-test three days before the 
experimental interview. In an effort to minimise priming or rehearsal effects related 
to the story, the children were not told they would be interviewed until after the 
story, at which point the experimenter indicated they would be asked about what 
they thought of the clown rather than the story. Each of the 96 children participated 
in the pre-test on emotion face-labelling. 
Pre-test interview 
The pre-test task was similar to that of Liwag and Stein (1995). Detailed 
instructions for the pre-test interview are in Appendix A. The experimenter 
provided four cards in random order, each with either a happy, sad, angry, or scared 
face drawn on it, and asked the children to label each face by pointing to it ( eg. 
"Which of these is a happy face?"). The four emotions labels were presented in a 
counter-balanced order and are attached in Appendix B. This task ensured children 
could categorise and label distinct emotions. 
Following the labelling of each emotion face, the children were encouraged to 
express the emotion themselves in order to test their ability to accurately express 
their internal emotional states through facial expressions. Children were asked, 
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"Can you show me what your face looks like when you're emotion ( eg happy)?" 
Finally the child was asked to re-enact each emotion: "What do you look like when 
you are emotion (happy)?" If the child queried the second question the 
experimenter prompted further with "Show me something you do when you are 
emotion ( eg happy)." The child was given time to respond following each question. 
Children who did not succeed on all of the pre-test activities ( emotion labelling, 
facial expression or emotional re-enactment) were engaged in two series of training 
for the activity they had failed. The training consisted of the experimenter 
modelling the activity to the child and asking them to try again. Of the 96 children 
who participated in the pre-test three received some training on the names of 
emotions and 17 received training on forming a facial expression. Sixty-four 
children were trained in re-enacting the emotion. These children appeared to not 
understand the verbal instructions since the majority of these children succeeded at 
the task following a single modelling of the activity by the experimenter. 
To meet the criteria for inclusion in the experiment, the children had to label the 
four emotion faces correctly as well as display a facial expression compatible with 
each emotion (for example a smile when asked to show a happy face). Children 
who could not do these tasks after two series of training were excluded from the 
experimental interview. All the children met the criteria for face labelling. Only 
two children did not meet the criteria for forming a facial expression which was 
judged using the criteria of the Facial Action Coding System, developed to 
categorise and label facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Despite the two 
series of training, one child could not form a sad facial expression while the other 
could not produce an angry face and these subjects were excluded from the 
experimental interview. The emotional re-enactment task was not judged as a 
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criterion for inclusion in the experiment, instead children were encouraged to play-
act, and the experimenter asked throughout, "How do you feel? Do you feel 
(happy)?" to ensure they had achieved the appropriate emotional state. All children 
reported feeling happy during the emotional re-enactment task. 
At the conclusion of the pre-test interview each child was asked to identify how 
they had felt when they heard the story, as well as how they felt when the clown 
visited, to ascertain his/her emotion at the time of encoding the stimulus material. 
Any child who responded to either of these questions with an answer other than 
"happy", was excluded from the experimental interview since this study focused 
only on the effects of positive mood on memory; negative mood induction having 
been shown to have a complex effect on emotional states and recall (Isen, 1984; 
Bartlett et al, 1982; Nasby & Yando, 1982). Four children were excluded from the 
experimental interview based on this criteria since three children reported the story 
made them angry while one child reported that the clown made him angry. Overall 
96% of the children responded that they had felt "happy" indicating that the clown, 
balloons and the story successfully induced a happy mood in the majority of the 
subjects . 
Finally children were asked whether they had previously heard or read the story and 
if so, were excluded form the experimental interview. This ensured that all children 
were recalling a novel event. Thirty children stated they had previously heard 
someone read them the story, most having heard it at pre-school the year before. 
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Experimental interview 
At Time 2, three days following the clown's visit and reading of the story, the 
experimenter re-visited the classroom and administered the experimental interview. 
All children who met the pre-test criteria took part in the experimental interview 
which was conducted individually with each child and audio taped by the 
experimenter. Children were randomly assigned to one of the three retrieval 
conditions. Detailed instructions for conducting the experimental interview are 
attached in Appendix C. 
The interviewer first asked whether each child remembered the day when the clown 
visited and read the story. All the children interviewed remembered both the visit 
and the story. The children were subsequently given specific instructions about the 
way in which the event was to be recalled according to their experimental 
condition. Twenty children were initially allocated to each condition and the 
instructions for each were based on the method employed by Liwag and Stein 
(1995). 
Condition 1 (Control Condition/Free Recall Condition): In this condition 
children were asked to freely recall as much of the story as possible. Whenever a 
child paused they were asked, "Can you remember anything else?" until the child 
remembered nothing further. 
Condition 2 (Facia.l Expression Condition): In this condition, each child was asked 
to tell the experimenter how they felt when they heard the story. The child was 
then asked to make a facial expression corresponding to that emotion after which 
he/she received the same recall instructions as in Condition 1. 
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Condition 3 (Emotion Reinstatement Condition): In this condition, each child was 
asked how he/she felt during the story and to make a facial expression that 
corresponded to the emotion as in Condition 2. After this each child was instructed 
to attempt a reinstatement of his/her original emotion and asked to recall the event 
as they did so. The instructions given for this were: 
Now can you tell me exactly what happened in the story? Try to remember what it feels 
like to be happy just like when you heard the story. Now try to remember what happened 
in the story. Pretend to be happy and at the same time tell me the story. Tell me as much 
as you can remember. 
Children in all three conditions were then presented with four probe questions after 
they had exhausted their free recall of the story. The order of the probe questions 
for this condition was as follows: 
Probes: 
1. Thoughts: What did you think about when this happened? 
2. Actions: What did you do? 
3. How did the story end? 
4. Can you remember anything else about the story or the day the clown visited? 
Following each response the child was asked "Can you remember anything else?" 
until the child remembered nothing further. 
· The first two probes were employed by Liwag and Stein (1995) to stimulate the 
children's memories of their thoughts and actions during the event to further trigger 
associated memories of the event. The third question replaced a probe question 
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used by Stein and Liwag which asked children to identify their feelings during the 
event. That question was excluded from the current study because of the possible 
interference of emotions on the control condition. The replacement question was 
chosen because it maintained the length of the interview without adding suggestive 
material and because it is a commonly used question in investigative interviews 
with children (Gieselman, Saywitz & Bornstein, 1993). The final question was 
included in this study, as it was in the Liwag and Stein (1995) study, to allow each 
child every opportunity to respond and be stimulated by the first three questions. 
Overall the probes also served to increase the duration of the experimental 
interview since longer interviews have been associated with stronger mood effects 
(Ucros, 1989). 
Of the 60 children who had been assigned to experimental conditions, four were 
excluded from the final results. Two children were not present on the day of 
testing. One child who initially denied having heard the story, stated during the 
experimental interview that he had heard the story previously. The fourth child was 
excluded because of extreme distractions during her interview. This resulted in 17 
subjects in Condition 1, 20 subjects in Condition 2, and 19 subjects in Condition 3. 
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Results 
Coding of Responses 
' 
The data consisted of the 56 children's full narratives for the experimental event. A 
narrative consisted of each child's response to the free recall question and the four 
probe questions. The children's responses were transcribed and later coded by both 
the experimenter and an assistant according to the categories outlined by Liwag and 
Stein (1995). The full coding rules are attached in Appendix A. 
Clausal units 
To analyse the children's recall, each narrative was first broken down into clausal 
units. A clausal unit equated to a simple sentence or idea, and was roughly defined 
by the presence of a noun and verb. 
Informative versus non-informative clausal units 
Each clause was then classified as either an informative or non-informative unit. 
Informative clauses were defined as those which related to the story or to the day 
the clown visited. Informative clauses also included impressions of the story, and 
memories of other events related to either the story or the clown's visit. 
Non-informative clauses consisted of responses that were unrelated to the story or 
the clowns visit. These included off-task verbalisations ( eg. "Let me play with the 
tape-player"), non-sensible comments ( eg. "He was.. " "Hmm"), unintelligible 
speech, spontaneous repetitions made by the child and non-spontaneous repetitions 
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requested by the interviewer when the child's response was unclear. If children 
responded with information that was included in one of the questions then it was 
also considered non-informative ( eg. "The girl visited her Granddad's house" was 
coded as non-informative because the children were instructed to recall "the story 
where a little girl visited her Granddad's house"). 
Informative clauses represented the overall quantity of relevant phrases each child 
recalled while non-informative clauses represented off-task responses. The mean 
recall of informative clauses by all the children in the experiment (M = 12.30 SD= 
5.69) was significantly different from their mean recall of non-informative clauses 
(M = 2.04 SD= 2.00; 1110 = 12.75, p < .05). Children's responses showed that they 
attended to the experimental questions and focused on the task at hand. 
Direct versus associative clauses 
To measure the accuracy of each child's recall, each informative clause was further 
defined as either direct or associative . Direct clauses consisted of responses which 
were directly related to the story and correct in content. Direct clauses were 
considered to be accurate representations of the story details and did not include 
inaccurate details. 
Associative clauses were defined as those which related to the reading of the story 
but not directly to the story content ( eg. "The clown had orange hair." or "My friend 
was pulling my hair"). Those statements which were associated in the child's mind 
with the event were also included ("My balloon's still at home") as were 
impressions of the story or the clown ( eg. "The story was funny"). Any incorrect 
memories of the story were also counted as associative information. 
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Each child's narrative was scored independently by a pair of coders. Clauses were 
classified according to the five categories (in brackets) and the raters' total scores 
for each category of clause was compared for each child. The existence of a clause 
was defined by each coder and as such there was no guarantee that the basic units of 
text were judged identical. Correlations for each coding pair were calculated using 
Pearson's r and were r = .98 (total clauses), .99(informative clauses), .99(non-
informative clauses), .99(direct clauses), .99(associative clauses) suggesting there 
was substantial agreement between the two coders. Any discrepancies in the 
coding were resolved through discussion between the two coders. 
Comparison of Recall Conditions 
To examine the effects of the emotional retrieval conditions on children's recall, a 3 
x 3 analysis of variance was conducted with the retrieval conditions ( control, facial 
expression and emotional re-enactment) as the between-groups variable, and the 
category of clauses recalled by each child ( direct clauses, associative clauses and 
non-informative clauses) as the within-subjects variable. 
There was a significant interaction between the retrieval condition and the category 
of clauses recalled by the children (F4.106 = 3.49, MSE = 6.32, p< .01). Analysis of 
main effects revealed a significant effect for the retrieval conditions (F2.s3 = 4.24, 
MSE = 12.92, p< .05) and for the category of clauses recalled, F2.106, MSE = 6.32, p 
< .05). 
Figure 1 shows the interaction between the three retrieval conditions and the three 
clause categories ( direct, associative and non-informative). The means (with 
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standard deviations in parentheses) for children's recall in the control, facial 
expression and emotional re-enactment conditions of direct clauses were 4. 71 (SD = 
2.17), 6.95 (SD= 3.38), and 9.16 (SD= 4.02) respectively; for associative clauses 
they were, 5.18 (SD = 4.02), 5.05 (SD = 3.20), and 5.58 (SD = 2.52) respectively; 
and for non-informative clauses they were 1.76 (SD= 1.34), 1.55 (SD= 1.70), and 
2.79 (SD= 2.55) respectively. Analysis of simple main effects revealed significant 
treatment effects for direct recall only, F2.106 = 19.22, 12 <.05. Post-hoc comparison 
analysis of direct recall using the Newman-Keuls statistic for ordered means 
revealed that the emotional re-enactment condition elicited significantly more recall 
of direct clauses than either the control condition or the facial expression condition 
(W2 = 2.21, 12< .05). Facial expression did not result in a significant improvement 
in recall of direct clauses when compared to the control condition (Ws = 2.24, 12> 
.05). 
There were also significant simple main effects for the category of recall at each of 
the three treatment levels, F2,106 = 7.13, MSE = 6.32, 12 <.05 for the control group, 
F2.106 = 25.59, MSE = 6.32, 12 <.05 for the facial expression group, and F2,106 = 30.64, 
MSE = 6.32, 12 <.05 for the emotional re-enactment group. Newman-Keuls tests 
revealed that recall of associative or direct clauses was significantly higher in all 
three experimental conditions than recall of non-informative, Ws = 3.42, 12 <.05 for 
controls, Ws = 3.59, 12 <.05 for the facial expression condition, and Ws = 2.79, 12 
<.05 for the emotional re-enactment condition. The amount of direct clauses 
recalled by children did not differ from the amount of associative clauses recalled 
except in the emotional re-enactment condition where children's recall of direct 
clauses was significantly greater than for associative clauses, W3 = 3.58, 12 <.05. 
( 
,I 
I 
i 
11: 
! 
I 
··I 
,ul 
I 
Improving children's recall of a personal event page 44 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
--+- Direct 
cu 5 0 -11-A.5sociative 
Cl) 
ct: 
4 
----.-- Non-informative 
3 
2 
1 
0 
Controls Facial Emotional 
Expression Re-
enactment 
Figure 2: Mean recall of direct, associative and non-informative data according to 
experimental condition 
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Errors 
Errors were initially scored as associative clauses but were later analysed 
independently of the associative clause measure. The number of errors children 
made about the story were very low across all conditions with 82% of all children 
reporting no inaccuracies about the story regardless of their experimental condition. 
Six children made a single error and only four children reported more than one 
error. The mean, standard deviations and range of errors generated by children 
according to their retrieval condition are shown in Table 1. A statistical comparison 
of the means was not undertaken because of the restriction in the range of errors, 
most children having scored no errors. It appeared that no relationship existed 
between the number of errors in the children's recall and the experimental condition 
with neither emotional re-enactment (M = .42 SD= .072) nor facial expression (M 
= .20 SD = .084) inflating the number of errors in the children's recall relative to 
the controls (M = .47 SD= .13). 
Error rates were calculated with errors as a percentage of accurate recall ( direct 
clauses). Table 1 shows the error rates for the three experimental conditions and 
indicates that children's errors accounted for a small proportion of recall ranging 
from an error rate of 3.18% for the facial expression to 4.66% for controls. The 
error rate for the emotional re-enactment condition was not higher than the rate for 
controls. 
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Table 1 
Mean Errors and Error Rates in Direct Recall according to Experimental Condition 
Control 
Condition 
Facial 
Expression 
Condition 
Emotional 
Re-enactment 
Condition 
n 
17 
20 
19 
Mean 
Errors 
.47 
.20 
.42 
SD 
.13 
.084 
.072 
Range of Error Rate 
Number of 
Errors 
0-6 
0-2 
0-4 
(%) 
4.66 
3.18 
3.19 
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Discussion 
Effects of Mood Induction Techniques on Accurate Recall 
Emotional re-enactment improved children's recall of accurate details without 
increasing the number of inaccuracies in children's reports when compared to 
controls. Facial Expression had no effect on children's recall of the story compared 
to controls. 
Emotional re-enactment 
The hypothesis that emotional re-enactment would improve children's recall of 
accurate details about a real-life emotional event was supported. Children who 
engaged in emotional re-enactment of their original happy mood recalled 
significantly more accurate information (ie. direct clauses) about the story 
c_ompared to those children in the control group. Children in the control group only 
recalled on average four clauses about the story supporting earlier findings that 
children have difficulty in providing lengthy responses in a free recall paradigm 
(Pipe et al, 1993). Whereas children in the emotional re-enactment condition 
recalled on average eight accurate clauses about the story, twice the recall of 
controls. These results were consistent with the findings of Liwag and Stein (1995) 
who also reported that emotional re-enactment increased children's recall about past 
events. 
Furthermore recall of accurate information ( direct clauses) by children in the 
emotional re-enactment condition was significantly higher than their recall of 
related information (associative clauses) showing the children were able to use 
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emotional re-enactment to improve their recall of the central event. Children in the 
control condition recalled roughly the same amount of direct as associative clauses 
showing they lacked strategies to direct their retrieval towards the event in question. 
Liwag and Stein also reported that emotional re-enactment resulted in more focused 
and directed narratives by children about the everyday events they had experienced. 
They suggested the cues from emotional re-enactment assisted children to sequence 
and organise their recall. Young children would otherwise rely on adults for such 
direction. The results of this study showing children recalled more direct clauses 
using emotional re-enactment, were consistent with the results of Li wag and Stein. 
Of equal importance was the finding that emotional re-enactment increased 
children's accurate recall without inflating the level of errors in their recall. In all 
conditions children made few errors supporting previous findings that young 
children's free recall is highly accurate (Dent & Stephenson, 1979; Pipe et al, 1993). 
However children in the emotional re-enactment condition recalled substantially 
more details about the event without making any additional errors when compared 
to children in the control group. This was true when the actual number of errors for 
each condition were considered as well as when error rates were considered. This 
was an important finding because other cuing techniques aimed at enhancing recall, 
such as presenting verbal cues or visual props to children, have been shown to also 
increase the number of errors and error rates in children's recall (Dale et al, 1978; 
Saywitz et al, 1991 ). Such experimenter-provided cues and props introduce 
suggestions to the child about what they should remember and therefore bias their 
recall and create errors in their reports. Emotional re-enactment achieved the aim 
of enhancing recall without introducing suggestions to children's retrieval by 
allowing children to identify and generate their own cue, the emotional state. 
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Rather than being presented with a cue chosen by the experimenter, children were 
shown a strategy which they were then able to use to self-cue their memories. 
Children could use emotional re-enactment to induce a mood state of appropriate 
type and intensity to enhance their recall of a particular event and this provided 
evidence for mood-state dependent memory in young children. Had the type and 
intensity of the original mood state not been matched at retrieval, children's recall 
of the story would not have been enhanced Their mood at retrieval may have 
enhanced their recall of other events and errors in recall would have risen. Previous 
studies had shown that young children could also use imagery techniques to induce 
a mood state and improve their recall of newly learned information (Bartlett et al, 
1982; Nasby & Yando, 1982). Taken together with the results of Liwag and Stein 
(1995) the current research showed great support for the concept of mood state-
dependent learning and also Network theory in young children. 
Despite these results supporting mood-state-dependent memory and Network theory 
in children, in recent papers Bower (1987; Bower & Mayer, 1989) stated that since 
his early hypnosis studies (Bower, 1981; Bower et al, 1978) he had not been able to 
replicate the findings of mood-state-dependent memory using the traditional list-
learning task with hypnosis as a mood induction technique. In reviewing his 
colleagues' and his own experiments with adults, he reported substantial support for 
other aspects of his Network theory but not for mood-state-dependent learning. He 
suggested that the mood-state dependent learning effect might only occur when the 
subject attributed his/her emotional state as being caused by the event in question 
( causal belongingness). Such an attribution would create strong network 
connections between the emotion and the event narrative. Bower maintained that 
unless the emotional state was perceived as an integral part of the event it would not 
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be connected to that event within the network. In a traditional list learning 
experiment, for example, where a mood is induced via hypnosis prior to the 
learning task, the subject may not attribute their mood to the event of learning the 
list and the ref ore not create connections between emotion nodes and concept nodes 
in the network. Thus mood-state-dependent learning would not occur. 
To test the causal belongingness hypothesis Bower (1989) used happy or sad music 
combined with emotional sentences to induce a mood state in adult subjects. 
Subjects were asked to imagine they were reliving the event in the sentence to 
ensure they attributed their mood state to the sent~nce. An example of a happy 
event was "You're walking along the street and find a $20 bill. You think of 
something unusual and pleasant to treat yourself with." Subjects alternated between 
reading happy and sad blocks of sentences, for example a subject may have read 
one block of eight happy sentences, followed by a rest period where the subject 
returned to a neutral mood state, and then read a block of eight sad sentences. 
Subjects were presented with four blocks, either happy-sad-happy-sad or the reverse 
order. Subjects' recall was then tested in either a happy or sad mood and a 
significant mood-state-dependent retrieval effect emerged. Subjects who learned 
the sentences when they were happy recalled significantly more happy episodes 
than sad episodes and subjects who learned the sentences when they were sad 
recalled more sad episodes than happy episodes. As Bower predicted when causal 
belongingness was achieved, the mood-state-dependent learning effect was found. 
However Bower reported that subsequent attempts to achieve causal belongingness 
had not been successful since not all subjects could induce alternating mood states 
as was required by his procedure, and a replication of the experiment did not find 
the mood-state-dependent effect on retrieval. He concluded that "mood-dependent 
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retrieval using laboratory-induced moods is an evanescent and unreliable 
phenomenon." (1989, p. 453). 
Possibly causal belongingness is very difficult to achieve in a laboratory setting 
because subjects create an emotional state with no obvious cues to elicit the 
emotion. It might be easier to achieve in an experimental design presented within 
our everyday context. Especially since in real-life situations, a person's emotional 
state is commonly a reaction to an event, so that causal belongingness is likely to be 
achieved. The current study used a real-life happy event (the· clown's visit) as well 
as a happy story to induce the children's mood at encoding. This was shown to 
achieve causal belongingness since 96% of children reported that the story and the 
clown visit made them happy. Li wag and Stein would have also achieved causal 
belongingness in their study since they achieved mood induction using children's 
own emotional reactions to real events. Future research might better test this 
hypothesis by using real-life designs. However these studies provide clear evidence 
for mood-state-dependent effects with recall of real-life events. 
Facial expression 
Forming a facial expression did not improve children's recall of the event, and this 
finding was contrary to the studies which have shown facial expression can achieve 
mood induction and improve recall in adults (Laird et al, 1982). However the 
current results replicated the findings for children reported by Liwag and Stein 
(1995) where three and five year old children could not use facial expression as a 
strategy to improve memory. Network theory would maintain that the emotional 
arousal from facial expression may have achieved the right type of mood ie. happy, 
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but was not intense enough to enhance the children's memories of the specific 
event. 
The discrepancy in the effects of facial expression on adults' and children's recall 
might be explained in terms of developing emotional awareness. Despite five year 
old children's rapidly increasing social awareness (Stein & Levine, 1989) these 
children may only be beginning to relate an external facial expression to their own 
internal emotional state and thus have not yet developed strong network 
associations between their memories of facial expressions and their emotion nodes 
in the semantic network. Because of the lack of associative connections, forming a 
facial expression alone, would not adequately arouse the emotion nodes and 
therefore would not enhance the memory of the event. The results suggested that 
five year old children required a more direct method of activating the network 
emotion nodes than forming a facial expression and also showed that facial 
expression alone was not an adequate method of mood induction for these young 
children. 
The discrepancy might also be related to the finding that even in adults, a large 
number of subjects could not use facial expression to induce a mood (Laird et al, 
1982). The discrepancy could therefore represent individual differences rather than 
represent developmental differences. Some children in this study may not have 
been able to use facial expression to make themselves happy. 
The finding that facial expression did not increase children's recall about the story 
showed that this part of the experimental instructions did not affect the children's 
performance in the emotional re-enactment condition. Therefore the re-enactment 
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of the emotional state (happiness) rather than the act of smiling, elicited the 
improved recall shown by those in the re-enactment condition. 
Overall facial expression did not improve children's recall of the story. Future 
research may determine whether this is due to developmental differences between 
children and adults or differences in all individuals' abilities to use facial expression 
as a method of mood induction. 
Effects of Mood Induction Techniques on Recall of Related and Non-Related 
Information 
Facial expression had no effect on children's recall of either non-informative or 
associative clauses. Overall facial expression had no effect on any of the categories 
of recall compared to controls. 
Emotional re-enactment also had no effect on children's recall of non-informative 
clauses. Children could pretend and act out their emotions without being silly or 
engaging in off-task behaviour. This finding supported the results of Liwag and 
Stein (1995) who also showed that emotional re-enactment had no effect on the 
children's recall of unrelated or off-task comments. Together the findings show that 
young children can engage in the process of emotional re-enactment while still 
staying focused on the task of retrieval. 
Children's recall of associative clauses ( or related information) was also unaffected 
by emotional re-enactment. This was contrary to Bow~r's concept of spreading 
activation (Bower, 1981; 1987). Bower proposed that activation spreads across the 
network via inter-linked connections, arousing concepts about the event as well as 
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numerous concepts related to the original cue(s). Recall of the event in question 
should be enhanced by an emotional cue but so should the recall of related events. 
This finding was also contrary to the findings of Liwag and Stein (1995) who 
reported that the children in their study who engaged in emotional re-enactment, not 
only increased their recall of the direct event but also of related events. 
There are two explanations which may account for the discrepancy in results 
between the current study and the theoretical prediction of spreading activation as 
well as the reported findings of Liwag and Stein (1995). One explanation for the 
current result is that the network arousal due to the emotional re-enactment was 
sufficient to boost the activation of directly related concepts and bring them into 
conscious awareness, but insufficient to arouse the nodes of associated events. This 
explanation assumes that the emotional re-enactment only induced a low intensity 
happy mood in the children causing a low level of arousal in the general network 
(Gilligan & Bower, 1984). Because activation dissipates as it spreads, a cue with a 
low level of arousal may only arouse a few direct connections before it fades. 
However in the current study this explanation appears unlikely, because of the large 
improvement in recall shown by those in the re-enactment condition. This 
suggested that the activation from the emotion cues was strong and therefore should 
have spread along many connecting pathways. 
A second explanation for the discrepancy in findings for associative memories 
pertains to the novelty of the event recalled by the children in this study. In the 
current study the event involved a clown visiting the classroom and reading a funny 
story. This may have been an unusual and the ref ore very specific event in the 
young children's memories. Furthermore, excluding children who had heard the 
story previously, ensured the story was a novel event for all children in the study. 
Iii 
I 
I 
/I; 
I 
jli 
{,, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
11l 
I 
I 
I 
'11 C 
Improving children's recall of a personal event page 55 
In contrast Liwag and Stein asked children to recall regular everyday events where 
their parents had recently observed them to express particular emotions. For 
happiness these prototypic events consisted of such instances as the child engaging 
in or mastering an event, getting a desired object, or participating in a family 
activity. Such events of an everyday nature might be commonly repeated 
occurrences for a young child, unlike the event in this study, and there is some 
evidence to show that young children are likely to remember repeated events 
differently to novel events. 
Powell and Thomson (1996) showed that four and five year old children have 
difficulty remembering a specific occurrence of a repeated events. Children in their 
study were asked to relate a specific instance from a series of six classroom 
activities. For example all six activities involved the children sitting on a mat, 
however sometimes the children sat on small individual mats and other times they 
all sat together on a large sheet. Another example of the variation was that the 
activity always involved constructing a puzzle, but the puzzle varied and was 
sometimes a clown, sometimes a bird. When children were asked to recall a 
particular episode they had difficulty reporting details which were specific to the 
particular event in question. Instead they confused the specific event with the other 
similar events and related many items of a general nature that were common 
features of all six events. For example when reporting about how they sat, children 
might become confused as to whether they sat on a small or large mat. Furthermore 
children confused the specific details and reported some details as belonging to one 
activity when they actually occurred during other activities. For example, reporting 
they had completed the clown puzzle on a day when they had in fact completed the 
bird puzzle. 
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Powell and Thomson (1996) explained this finding in terms of script theory which 
maintains that schema exist in the memories and help to categorise events. After 
one experience a child has no schema for an event and it is stored as a single event 
in the network with connections between the specific features of that event. After 
several repetitions of an event however, a cohesive representation forms from the 
overlapping features of the events. The emergence of the schema implies that some 
details specific to a single event will eventually become lost as the connections 
between these details become comparatively weaker than connections within the 
over-riding schema. However the schema also results in a stronger memory trace 
for the prototypic details which will then be easily remembered. When a child is 
asked to recall a specific instance of a repeated event they would be likely to recall 
the prototypic details, some of which will correctly relate to the event in question. 
However some details that are prototypic will actually be about other events, but 
will be recalled by the child since the connections between the prototypic items are 
strong. On the other hand when a child is asked to recall a novel event the specific 
features of the event should be more easily recalled because a schema has not yet 
developed, while few associated events exist and are therefore unlikely to be 
recalled. 
This explanation is consistent with Network theory (Bower, 1981) which maintains 
that pathways between nodes or items in an event become strengthened with 
repeated use so that the common features of a repeated occurrence will be more 
strongly connected to each event than specific or unusual features. This 
explanation also accounts for the findings of Liwag and Stein where children were 
asked to recall a number of common events. When those children's recall of the 
direct event was enhanced through emotional re-enactment, their recall of related 
events was also enhanced. In the current study the event of the clown visit, because 
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of its uniqueness, may have been a clearly defined event in the network but quite 
loosely associated to other events and unable to arouse associated memories. Thus 
for a novel event it might be expected that information about the event would be 
readily recalled without any effect on the recall of other related events as occurred 
in this study. Whereas for common events it would be expected that the recall of 
the event in question would also elicit memories of related events. 
Clinical Implications 
Since emotional re-enactment improved children's recall without affecting the 
number of errors they made, emotional re-enactment would be a useful tool for 
clinical interviews, especially with young children who require strategies to guide 
their re-telling of an experience. All the children in this study were ultimately able 
to use this strategy to induce a mood state. Most required some training to 
encourage the acting process but the majority succeeded at the task following a 
single training session in re-enactment. All the children were able to pretend to be 
happy and all reported feeling happy, which showed they had b~en able to use the 
re-enactment procedure to induce a happy mood. Based on this study, emotional 
re-enactment should be useful with most young children and by using this 
technique in clinical interviews, a clinician would expect a fuller account from a 
child who engaged in emotional re-enactment than a child who was asked to 
provide free recall only. 
Although more evidence is required of this technique with other emotions and more 
complex events, emotional re-enactment might also be useful in conducting 
investigative interviews with young children since emotional re-enactment had no 
effect on the number of errors made by children in this study. As witnesses, 
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children may be called upon to testify about events such as murder, domestic 
violence and serious accidents. As victims, children may testify concerning sexual 
and/or physical abuse (Miller & Fremouw, 1995). In these circumstances there is a 
premium on accurate recall with a view to minimising errors where possible and 
this technique achieved both these goals for happy emotions with the children in 
this study. This study did not investigate the effect of emotional re-enactment on 
children's recall of negative events, however this does not preclude the use of 
emotional re-enactment for investigative interviews since in some of the above 
instances children's emotional state may not be negative, for example in incidents 
of sexual abuse young children's experience is not always negative (Lamb, 
Sternberg & Esplin, 1994). However some investigative interviews will concern 
situations which have been unpleasant for the child and future research must 
endeavour to show the value of this strategy with negative emotional experiences. 
In considering this technique with investigative and clinical interviews, it should be 
acknowledged that emotional re-enactment and other forms of mood induction 
should never be considered for extremely negative events which may have 
involved severe trauma for the child, or repeated traumatic events such as chronic 
sexual abuse. First, trauma affects a child's ability to tell what has happened 
(Bentovim, Bentovim, Vizard & Wiseman, 1995). When asked to discuss such 
' 
events some children become agitated and aroused and attempt to avoid the topic of 
the event. Emotio~al re-enactment requires the child to re-live the emotional 
experience and traumatised children may not be able to engage in such a task. 
Second, Van der Kolk and Fisler (1995) maintained that repeated traumatic 
experiences are likely to be encoded in a different form to normal emotional 
experiences. Children can dissociate from traumatic events so that the sensory and 
emotional experiences may become disconnected from the verbal narrative at 
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encoding. Thus the emotional and verbal nodes are not inter-woven in a network 
and cannot be used to trigger each other. For cases where the event in question is 
likely to have been extremely traumatic for the child, encouraging the child to 
engage in emotional re-enactment should not be considered. Of course not all 
negative events are experienced by children as traumatic and a sensitive clinician or 
interviewer should be able to discern from the child as well as the reports of the 
parents and other adults, when such a technique might be warranted. 
In considering the effects of manipulating emotion to enhance children's recall 
some consideration should be given as to how naturally occurring mood states 
might affect recall, even when mood manipulation does not occur. Naturally 
occurring moods have been shown to affect adult attention and learning. Both 
clinically depressed adults and mildly depressed college students were shown to 
' 
recall more negative items than non-depressed adults (Bullington, 1991 ). Naturally 
occurring moods have not yet been investigated with young children in terms of 
effects on recall however since self-induced moods were shown to affect recall in 
this study and others, it follows naturally occurring moods would also affect recall. 
A child's natural mood state may be advantageous in some instances where the 
child is asked to discuss an emotional event which matches his or her current mood. 
However a contrasting mood state could impede discussion of emotional material 
and events (Bower et al, 1978). Thus the interviewer needs to be aware of the 
child's current mood and how it will impact on their recall to avoid, for example, 
inadvertently inducing a happy mood in the waiting room before discussing a sad 
event in the interview room. Neutrality of mood may be pref erred. 
Some consideration should also be given as to how best to use the emotional re-
enactment strategy with children. It might be employed as an interview strategy on 
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its own given the substantive improvement in recall shown by the children in this 
study. A number of researchers have discussed guidelines for investigative 
interviews with children which aim to reduce bias from the interviewer and errors 
in recall. However these guidelines lack strategies aimed at directly enhancing 
recall. Such guidelines have included building rapport (McGough & Warren, 1994; 
Wood, McClure & Birch, 1996); establishing ground rules for the interview, eg. 
Informing the child that it is all right to say "I don't know" (McGough & Warren, 
·1994); conducting a practice interview (Gieselman, Saywitz & Bornstein, 1993; 
Yuille, Hunter, Joffe & Zapamiuk, 1993); and employing open-ended questions 
where possible, using specific questions only after free recall is exhausted 
(Gieselman et al, 1993; McGough & Warren, 1994; Wood et al, 1996, 1996; Yuille 
et, 1994 ). Emotional re-enactment could be incorporated with these guidelines 
since it would not inflate errors but would add to the amount of recall normally 
provided by children in the free recall portion of their interview. 
Since emotional re-enactment might not be useful for recalling all types of events, 
an interviewer might prefer to form a set of available techniques which incorporates 
emotional re-enactment. A set of techniques could then be adapted to suit the 
individual needs of the child and the circumstances surrounding the event. 
However despite the considerable literature emphasising the potential distortions in 
child testimony, few researchers have investigated strategies to enhance recall and 
reduce the reliance on verbal questions which have been shown to foster elaboration 
but risk distortion. 
One formalised interview procedure, the Cognitive Interview (Gieselman et al, 
1984) presents a number of mnemonic strategies in an ordered protocol for 
interviewing. The Cognitive Interview was initially developed to improve adult 
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memories (Gieselman et al, 1984) but has recently been found to increase children's 
recall of events without an accompanied increase in incorrect detail (Gieselman, 
Saywitz & Bornstein, 1993 ). Like Network theory the cognitive interview adopts 
the assumption that the effectiveness of any technique to access a memory is related 
to the extent of overlap between the features of the retrieval technique and the 
features comprising the memory. The Cognitive Interview further assumes that 
when information cannot be accessed by one retrieval technique, it may be 
accessible with a different technique or cue. The Cognitive Interview adopts four 
general interview techniques: (1) mentally reconstructing or visualising the event 
(2) reporting everything, even partial information, regardless of the perceived 
importance (3) recounting the event in a variety of orders, for instance backwards 
instead of forwards and ( 4) reporting the event from a variety of perspectives. A 
child would be asked to engage in each of these strategies in sequence followed by 
more specific questions to facilitate the recall of details, for example, "Did the 
person remind you of anyone you know?" A practice interview about a neutral 
event using the above techniques is always conducted prior to the investigative 
interview in order to build rapport with the child, familiarise the child with the 
interview process and to provide a base rate for the child's language abilities and 
narrative styles. 
Gieselman et al (1993) showed the cognitive interview enhanced free recall for both 
8 and 9 year olds as well as 11 and 12 year old children. Children observed a slide 
show and encountered three adults in conjunction with this: the experimenter, the 
slide show operator and a "surfer dude" who wandered into the children's waiting 
room following the slide show. The children were later interviewed about the slide 
show as well as the waiting room experience by detectives from the Los Angeles 
County Sheriffs Department who had been trained with the interview procedure. 
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Although there was some variation as to how closely the detectives followed the 
interview protocol, the results showed that all children interviewed with the 
Cognitive Interview recalled significantly more correct facts than controls without 
any significant increase in the number of incorrect items generated. 
Emotional re-enactment could be used in conjunction with this interview by 
replacing the first recall strategy, mental reconstruction or visualisation of the event 
where appropriate. Using emotional re-enactment prior to the other mnemonic 
strategies could have a strong effect on retrieval since Network theory maintains 
that emotional arousal in the network is maintained longer than arousal from other 
types of arousal, including visual cues (Gilligan and Bower, 1984). Thus the 
arousal of the network created by emotional re-enactment might be maintained 
while the other mnemonic strategies are employed. The additive effects of this 
activation could arouse many more memories into conscious awareness than each 
of the strategies alone although this needs to be further investigated. 
One criticism of the cognitive interview technique however is that there is no 
research to investigate the utility of this technique with children aged younger than 
eight. Furthermore in the above study (Gieselman et al, 1993) the eight and nine 
year old children had less success with using some of the specific question 
techniques than the older children, for instance asking children if one of the people 
mentioned reminded them of someone they know. It is unclear how useful such 
techniques would be with even younger children, though some authors have 
speculated that younger children would have more difficulty with some of the 
techniques, for example reporting the event from a number of perspectives 
(McGough & Warren, 1994). However one value of the cognitive interview is the 
variety of non-suggestive strategies developed to offer the interviewer and the child 
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options in exploring memory strategies. Emotion may not be a useful cue for all 
children nor all events and in such cases the cognitive interview would provide 
alternatives. 
The second interview technique discussed in the literature is the Narrative 
Elaboration Process (Saywitz, Snyder & Lamphear, 1996). Like the Cognitive 
Interview, this technique teaches children strategies to structure their own recall. 
However the cognitive interview still relies on numerous verbalisations from the 
interviewer while the Narrative Elaboration Process teaches children to use visual 
cue cards as symbols for verbal cues to further minimise verbal exchanges. This 
technique directly addresses young children's reliance on adults for cues such as 
who, what, when, where, how and why (Hudson, 1990). It does this by providing 
these prompts in the form of visual symbols on five cue cards. For example a stick 
figure represents participants and prompts the child to consider who was present. 
Other figures represent the setting (where), actions (how), consequences (what) and 
conversation/affective state (why). Prior to the interview children are trained in the 
meaning of the five symbolic cue cards which are then presented at the conclusion 
of the investigative interview as reminders. 
In two studies (Saywitz et al, 1996; Saywitz & Snyder reported in Saywitz et al, 
1996) the Narrative Elaboration Process was shown to increase children's recall 
without any associated increase in errors. Saywitz et al ( 1996) used this technique 
with seven year old children and tested the effects of this process on both free recall 
and cued recall (using the reminder cards). A classroom of second grade children 
had a "student teacher" run one of the daily lessons. Two weeks later half the 
students were trained in using the cards as reminder signs for other memories while 
half received a control interview. Two days after the training all the children were 
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interviewed about the lesson with the student teacher, first in a free recall paradigm 
to test the ability of the children to spontaneously use the technique and then those 
in the experimental condition were cued with the reminder cards present. The 
Narrative Elaboration Process had no effect on the free recall paradigm showing 
that the seven year old children had not internalised the strategies. However when 
the cue cards were presented children's recall improved 53% over controls. 
A technique such as the Narrative Elaboration Process could be used in conjunction 
with the emotional re-enactment technique, but like the Cognitive Interview, might 
be most useful if it preceded the cue cards. The arousal from the emotional re-
enactment in the memory network might be maintained during the visual cuing and 
further add to the retrieval process. Like the Cognitive Interview, this technique is 
new and has not yet been shown to be useful with younger children. Further 
research with this technique is warranted. 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
There were three features relating to the design of this study which limited the 
application of the results to the general task of interviewing young children. First, 
this study tested recall within a three day time frame. The results here . pertained to 
children's memories of recent events and may not be generalised to more long term, 
established memories. Liwag and Stein (1995) showed that emotional re-enactment 
successfully enhanced children's recall of a real-life event for up to two weeks, 
however longer term investigations of children's recall are warranted to ascertain 
whether emotional re-enactment will be useful in enhancing children's distant 
memories. Studies using adults have found other methods of mood induction such 
as hypnosis, can enhance memories extending back years, even to childhood 
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(Bower, 1981) and future research should investigate whether children can use 
emotion to enhance memories over a longer time frame than two weeks. 
Second, the current study investigated the effects of a happy mood on the recall of a 
happy event only. These results are therefore limited to events involving happy 
emotion and cannot be generalised to negative states of emotion. However other 
research has explored this and showed that positive mood creates a stronger effect 
on memory than negative mood (Bartlett et al, 1982; Bartlett & Santrock, 1979; 
Li wag & Stein, 1995; Nasby & Yando, 1982). Negative emotion may not enhance 
recall as well as positive emotion because people do not enjoy experiencing 
negative emotional states. . Isen (1984) proposed that people actively defend 
themselves against negative emotional experiences by attempting to engage in 
positive experiences and repair their mood state. Liwag and Stein (1995) measured 
the effects of both positive and negative emotional re-enactment and reported that 
although happiness resulted in superior recall compared to other emotional states, 
emotional re-enactment of negative emotions (sadness, anger and fear) still 
improved recall compared to · controls. Thus negative emotions may not effect 
memories to the same extent that positive emotions do, but negative emotions may 
still significantly improve retrieval. The relative value of inducing a negative mood 
would have to be weighed against the possible upset this might cause to the child. 
However the effects of negative and other moods ( eg. Surprise) on memory should 
be further investigated since a variety of emotional issues besides happy ones are 
explored in clinical interviews with children. 
A final limitation of the study was that because all children made very few errors, 
the experimental task may have been relatively easy for them. Remembering the 
story required the recall of items from a single stimulus, the book, which was read 
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by a single person. A more complex event, involving numerous stimuli and 
characters, might make more demands on children's attentional capacities and 
inflate the level of errors for all children. This could be investigated in future 
studies using a more sophisticated real-life events as the dependent variable. 
Future research might also investigate the utility of real events to induce a mood 
state and achieve causal belongingness, given the positive findings regarding 
emotional re-enactment from this study. Bowe~ (1987) maintained that the mood-
state-dependent effect would only be obtained when subjects associated their 
emotional state to the to-be-remembered event ( causal belongingness) but has not 
found support for this in laboratory studies. The current study achieved casual 
belongingness by engaging subjects in a real-life event to induce their mood state, 
and also achieved the mood-state-dependent effect. Future research using real 
events rather than the two-list laboratory design employed by Bower may add 
further understanding to Bower's hypothesis. 
Future research should also investigate the relative merit of the memory enhancing 
strategies discussed here ( emotional re-enactment, the Cognitive Interview, and the 
Narrative Elaboration Process) to explore which strategies are most helpful with 
I 
young children who are most in need of retrieval strategies. The three techniques 
have all been shown to increase children's recall without inflating errors in various 
studies but have not been compared in a single study and have not been compared 
in a sample of same-aged children. Knowing the relative magnitude of 
improvement shown by each strategy will help interviewers to limit the number of 
strategies required for a single interview. Young children may become 
overwhelmed if presented with too many strategies, particularly if each strategy 
requires some training as the above techniques do. Also using the most efficient 
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retrieval strategies will help to limit the length of interviews and possibly avoid the 
need for repeated interviews. 
The effect of emotional re-enactment on the recall of repeated versus uncommon 
events is another topic for future research. The current results showed that for a 
novel event emotional re-enactment improved children's recall of details about the 
event without increasing their recall of details about related events. However the 
study by Liwag and Stein (1995) which probably asked children to relate more 
common and thus repeated events, found children's recall of associated events also 
increased. The discrepancy in findings may be explained in the way children 
encode repeated events, so that common features of a repeated event are more easily 
activated than specific features (Bower, 1981; Powell and Thomson, 1996). 
However this was not directly tested by the current study and future research could 
clarify the relative effects of enhancing the recall of repeated versus novel events. 
Finally future research should explore new strategies for enhancing young 
children's recall. It is well known that young children lack strategies to prompt 
their memories. However the majority of research to date has addressed the task of 
refining verbal interviews to reduce suggestibility and errors, rather than 
investigating new strategies which may directly enhance free recall. The concept 
of a semantic memory network provides many avenues for investigating such 
strategies, since it assumes that the full sensory experience of an event is recorded 
in inter-linked nodes. Re-enactment of any of the sensory experiences at recall 
should serve to enhance the memory of an event. For example re-enacting the 
physical actions of an event should enhance the memory for that event just as re-
enacting the emotional state does. Further research could investigate the effects of 
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physical re-enactment on young children's memory as a starting point to investigate 
other sensory reactions as cues. 
Conclusion 
Overall the current study supported the use of emotion as a cue to enhance 
children's memories of happy events. The emotional re-enactment technique was 
shown to successfully induce an emotional state in 5 and 6 year old children and 
significantly improve their recall of a past event without any effect on errors in 
recall. This finding supports the use of emotional re-enactment for clinical and 
investigative interviews. This finding also supports Bower's (1981) hypothesis of 
mood-state-dependent memory. 
The current study did not find any support for the use of the facial expression 
technique with young children, since recall was unaffected by forming a facial 
expression. Further research may be useful to determine whether this was due to 
individual or developmental differences in the ability to use facial expression to 
induce a mood state. 
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Appendix A: Procedures Used to Train the Facial Expressions and Emotional 
Re-enactment in the Pre-test Interview 
Face Labelling Task 
The four face cards were presented together in random order. 
Experimenter asks: 
"Which one is a happy face? 
"Which one is a sad face? 
"Which one is an angry face? 
"Which one is a scared face? 
(The order in which these four questions were asked was counter-balanced for each 
subject.) 
Training for Face Labelling: 
If the child's response to any question was wrong then the child was engaged in up 
to two series of training. A training series consisted of the experimenter correcting 
the child's response and asking the child the four questions again. 
Criteria for Inclusion: 
Each child had to correctly label the four facial expressions within two training 
sessions for inclusion in the study. Any child requiring 1nore than two training 
sessions was excluded from the experimental interview. 
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Facial Expression (FE) and Emotional Re-enactment (ER) Tasks: 
The follo\.ving en1otions were randomly presented to the subject: 
1. HAPPY 
FE: Can you show 1ne what your face looks like when you're happy? 
ER: What do you look like when you're happy? (Show me something you do 
when your're happy?) 
ER Prompt: What does your chest do when you're happy? 
2. SAD 
FE: Can you show n1e what your face looks like when you're sad? 
ER: What do you look like when you're sad? (Show me something you do 
vvhen you're sad?) 
ER Prompt: What do your shoulders do when you're sad? 
3. ANGRY 
FE: Can you show n1e what your face looks like when you're angry? 
ER: \Vhat do you look like when you're angry? (Show me something you do 
when you're angry?) 
ER Prompt: What do your fists do when you're angry? 
4. SCARED 
FE: Can you show n1e what your face looks like when you're scared? 
ER: What do you look like when you're scared? (Show me something you do 
when you're scared?) 
ER Prompt: What do your shoulders do when you're sad? 
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Training for Facial Expression Task: 
If a child's response to the facial expression question was inaccurate ( eg. he/she 
sn1iled when asked tQ look angry) then the child was allowed to engage in up to two 
series of training for that facial expression. A series of training consisted of the 
experimenter saying, "Let me show you what my face looks like when I am 
(angry)" and n1odelling an appropriate facial expression. After each training the 
child was asked to n1ake the facial expression again. 
Inclusion Criteria for Facial Expression Task: 
Each child had to produce a facial expression matching each of the four emotions 
within two training sessions for inclusion in the study. A facial expression was 
judged to be accurate if it included some common features for that expression as 
described by Ekn1an and Friesen (1975). For example, common features of a happy 
face included a sn1ile, wide eyes, raised eyebrows; a lowered top lip, raised bottom 
lip and lovvered eyes for a sad face; a terse n1outh, slanted eyebrow and wrinkled 
brow for an angry face ; and raised eyebrows, wide eyes and open mouth for a 
scared face. 
Training for En1otional Re-enactn1ent Task: 
The en1otional re-enactn1ent task was not a test for inclusion in the study and there 
were no strict standards for emotional re-enactment. Children were encouraged to 
create their own state of e1notional re-enactlnent through the two emotional re-
enact1nent questions and the prompt. However any child who did not respond to 
the three requests to show what their body looked like, or any child whose body 
actions obviously contradicted the emotion in question (for example a child who 
n1istook the card in question and pretended to cry when asked to show what they 
looked like when happy) was engaged in up to two series of training . A training 
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series consisted of the experimenter stating, "Let me show you what my body does 
when I an1 (happy)" and n1odelling a stereotyped response. For instance if the 
experimenter n1odelled a happy action she stood up tall with her chest out, head 
high'i and a happy facial expression; for a sad action the experimenter dropped her 
head and shoulders, rubbed her eyes and adopted a sad expression; for an angry 
action she clenched her fists and adopted an angry expression; and for a surprised 
action she raised her arn1s and shoulders, sat up quickly and adopted a surprised 
expression. After each training the child was encouraged to mimic the 
experin1enter and adopt their own pose. 
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Appendix B: Face Stin1tdi for the Face Labelling Task presented in the Pre-Test 
Interview 
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Appendix C: Procedures for Conducting the Experimental Interview 
Introduction to Session (all conditions) "Last time I was here we talked about 
feelings and looked at some cards with faces, and you made some lovely pretend 
faces, and you showed me how your body looks sometimes. Do you remember 
that?" 
"Today I'd like to talk a bit more about some of the other things that happened on 
that day, just like last time." 
"Let's turn this tape player on like before. Can you remember how?" (The 
experi1nenter lets the child turn the tape player on.) "Can you say your name?" 
"Ok we'd better check and see if it worked" 
"Do you remember the other day at school when the clown came to visit?" "Do 
you remember when you got the balloon?" 
"The clown read you a story on that day which was about a girl who visited her 
Grandad's house. Do you remember that story?" 
Control/Free Recall Condition ( Condition 1) 
"Can you tell me exactly what happened in the story? Tell me as much as you can 
remember." 
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Facial Expression Condition (Condition 2) 
"Tell me how you felt when you heard that story." 
"Can you make a face to show me how you felt when you heard the story?" 
"Can you tell me exactly what happened in the story? Tell me as much as you can 
remember." 
Emotion Re-enactment Condition ( Condition 3) 
"Tell me how you felt when you heard that story." 
"Can you make a face to show me how you felt when this happened?" 
"Now, can you tell me exactly what happened in the story? Try to reme1nber what 
it feels like to be (happy) just like when you heard the story. (Can you show me 
what you look like when you're happy? Do you feel happy?) Now try to remember 
what happened in the story. Pretend to be happy and at the same time tell me the 
story. Tell me as much as you can remember." 
Probes 
Probe questions were presented after the initial questions in each of the three 
conditions. The probe questions follow: 
"What did you think about when you heard the story?" 
"What did you do?" 
"How did the story end?" 
"Can you remember anything else about the story or about the day the clown 
visited?" 
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Appendix D: Rules for Coding Children's Responses 
Step 1: Code Clausal Units 
Clausal Unit(Code = "C") 
• Roughly a simple sentence (a noun and verb) 
• Included statements "a penguin" or "ca1nel" (because "I saw" is 
implied) 
• Two clauses in a sentence which were connected by "and", "when", etc 
were counted as two separate clauses. 
eg. " They were in the garden and Grandpa was in the wheelbarrow." 
should have been scored as two clauses. "There was sand in the floor 
when the TV was in the fishbowl" was scored as two clauses. 
• "No", "I don't remember any more," "That's all", "That's the end 
of the story" etc. were not counted as clausal units. Even if it was the 
only response they give. 
• Information gathered before the interview questions or after the final 
question has been responded to as "no" or some equivalent was not 
counted as a clausal unit. 
STEP2: Score each Clausal Unit as either an Informative clause or a Non-
Informative Clause 
Informative Clause (Code= "I") 
• Sensible clauses 
• Information related to the story (right or wrong) 
• Infopnation related to the clown visit 
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• What they or friends did or descriptions of this, "My friend has brown 
hair." "I I aughed at Robert." 
• Con1n1ents about the balloons "We got balloons" 
• linprcssions of the story ,"I liked it", "It was funny." 
Non-Infonnativc Clauses (Code= "NI") 
• No direct relationship to the story 
• S po n tan co us repetitions , unless by repeating they also added extra 
inlorn1ation 
cg. Ir a child said, "They all laughed" and later said, "They all 
laughed" again to one of the pron1pts, then the second clause was 
counted as a non-inforn1ative clause. However if a child later said, 
"They all laughed because Grandpa had different socks," then the 
seco nd clause was scored as infonnative and direct. 
• Non-spontaneous repetitions requested by the interviewer. The 
spo ntaneo us repetitions were used to decide if the first clause was 
so n1eth i ng related to the story or to the day the clown visited in which 
cc1.se it \vas scored as direct. If it was related to something else it was 
sco red as ossociative. 
cg . If a chi lei said, "A bird." and on clarification then said, "The girl 
\\ ·ent over the water and was riding on the swan." then code the first 
clause as inforn1ative and direct. Code the second clause as a non-
i17fonno1 ive clause. If after the clarification the child said, "The bird at 
n1y house ." then the first clause was scored as informative and 
ussociutive. The second clause would have been coded as non-
infhrmo/ ive 
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• Off-task vcrbalisation's ("Let me play .with the tape player", "Can we 
listen to it ( the tape recording) again?") 
• Unintelligible speech 
STEP 3: Code every Informative Clause as either a Direct or an Associative 
Clause 
Direct Clause (Code= "D") 
• lnforrnation directly linked to the STORY only 
• Correct inforn1ation only 
AssociatiYc Clause (Code= "A") 
• F\-ents \\ hich preceded or follo,ved the STORY or were somehow 
associated in the child's mind with the event, but not directly related to 
the story. Basically whatever the child seemed to equate with their 
111c111ory of the day they heard the story. 
• I 11 f or111a ti 011 related to the clo,vn 's visit, "She· gave us balloons," "I went 
to a c I o \, · n pa rt y. " 
• Things about friends during the story "I was pulling my friends hair." 
thi11gs about balloons and home. "I gave my brother my balloon." 
• In1press ions of the story, "Grandad was funny." "I liked the clown." 
• Errors: any incorrect recollections of the story. eg. "There was a 
di11osaur.'' 
